Check these three things.
-
System owner: confirm every on-premises ScreenConnect server with RMM+ installed has the RMM+ extension disabled, because no fixed RMM+ version has been announced.
What to confirm
- List every ScreenConnect server and whether the third-party DataComm RMM+ extension is installed.
- All RMM+ extension versions are affected.
- Servers without the extension are not affected.
- The ScreenConnect server and client software are not affected.
- For each server with RMM+, record:
- Whether the extension is enabled or disabled.
- Who confirmed it.
- The date.
- No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Disabling the extension is the current mitigation.
- Cloud-hosted ScreenConnect: no action required. ConnectWise disabled and removed the extension there.
- On-premises ScreenConnect:
- Disable the extension immediately.
- Verify it remains disabled.
- Do not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance.
- An administrator can change the API secret, but the published remedy is to disable the extension.
- List every ScreenConnect server and whether the third-party DataComm RMM+ extension is installed.
-
Network owner: confirm who could reach ScreenConnect servers that ran RMM+ with its default API secret.
When the risk applies
- The risk applies only while all of these were true:
- RMM+ was installed and enabled.
- Its API secret still had the default value.
- Someone could send requests to the extension's API over a network.
- The CVSS rating assumes no sign-in and no user action are needed.
- Public exposure is unknown. The sources do not say whether affected servers face the internet.
- A reachable ScreenConnect sign-in page does not show whether the RMM+ API is reachable or safe. The Network owner checks the network routes to each server that ran RMM+.
- Records to use:
- Extension inventory and the dates RMM+ was enabled.
- Change history showing whether and when the secret was changed. Do not copy the secret value.
- Firewall and remote-access rules for each server.
- The risk applies only while all of these were true:
-
Security owner: check managed-agent records for commands your team did not send.
What the records can show
- Review the period when RMM+ was enabled with the default secret:
- ScreenConnect and RMM+ records of extension API requests.
- Commands sent to managed agents.
- Unexpected changes on managed computers.
- Compare each command with authorized work. If any command is unexplained, start incident response.
- Limits:
- The sources name no specific signs of misuse.
- The sources do not say which logs record extension API requests.
- Disabling the extension does not rule out earlier misuse.
- Unexplained commands need a response even if this flaw cannot be shown as the cause.
- Review the period when RMM+ was enabled with the default secret:
If RMM+ is enabled on an on-premises server: disable it now. Cloud-hosted ScreenConnect needs no action.
Do Now
- System owner: disable the RMM+ extension on every on-premises ScreenConnect server with RMM+ installed.
Completion evidence
- For each server, record:
- Server name.
- Extension status: disabled.
- Who disabled it.
- The date.
- No fixed RMM+ version has been announced.
- Cloud-hosted ScreenConnect needs no action. ConnectWise disabled and removed the extension there.
- For each server, record:
- Security owner: start incident response if agent records show commands your team did not send.
What to ask
- Preserve the related ScreenConnect, RMM+ and managed-computer records.
- Identify which managed agents received each unexplained command.
- Record the outcome and the date.
Do Next
- System owner: recheck that no one re-enables or reinstalls RMM+ before further vendor guidance.
Completion evidence
- Record each recheck:
- Server name.
- Extension status.
- The date.
- The advisory says to verify the extension remains disabled and not to re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance.
- Record each recheck:
Check your own records.
- Use your approved AI tool.
- Require evidence. Flag unknowns.
Read the prompt
The reported finding
RMM+ extension static default API secret (CWE-1392)
Original advisory →- Required conditions
- The third-party DataComm RMM+ extension (module: ScreenConnect extension API), any version, is installed on ConnectWise ScreenConnect.
- The extension's API secret keeps its static default value. An API secret is a shared password that programs use to call the extension.
- A requester can reach the extension API over a network. CVSS 4.0 rates this as needing no privileges and no user interaction.
- Reported outcome
- Unauthorized requests may be accepted by the extension API, including requests to send commands to managed agents. Managed agents are the software on computers the extension sends commands to.
- The ScreenConnect server and client software are not impacted.
- The sources do not describe what specific commands agents accept or what those commands can change.
Fix guidance
- ConnectWise: no fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Disabling the extension is the current mitigation.
- Boundaries:
- All RMM+ extension versions are affected.
- Deployments without the extension are not affected.
- Cloud-hosted ScreenConnect: no action required. ConnectWise disabled and removed the extension.
- On-premises ScreenConnect:
- Disable the extension immediately.
- Verify it remains disabled.
- Do not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance.
- Current status and earlier exposure:
- Disabling the extension ends its current exposure but does not show whether it was misused earlier.
- The sources do not state when ConnectWise removed the extension from cloud environments.
- Ratings and exploitation status:
- ConnectWise rates CVSS 4.0 9.3 Critical (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). The unreviewed GitHub advisory shows the same 9.3 score.
- CISA ADP assessment (SSVC, November 12, 2026):
- Exploitation: none.
- Automatable: yes.
- Technical Impact: total.
- The CISA KEV catalog version 2026.11.13, released November 13, 2026 and retrieved November 15, 2026, has no entry for this CVE.
- Neither the CISA assessment nor the KEV result establishes that exploitation has not occurred.
What IntegrityLab.ai can check
- Within authorized targets and budget, IntegrityLab.ai discovery records reachable web services:
- HTTP status.
- Page title.
- Server banner.
- Current assessor code has no detector for the RMM+ extension or CVE-2026-127063. It cannot establish:
- Whether RMM+ is installed or enabled.
- The extension version.
- Whether the default API secret was retained.
- Whether commands were sent to managed agents.
- A reachable web service, title or banner shows only that the service answered. It neither proves RMM+ is present nor rules it out.