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CVEHit Business Advisory by IntegrityLab.ai

Does this affect us?

ScreenConnect RMM+ default secret can allow commands to managed agents — CVE-2026-127063: Business Triage

Check these three things.

  1. System owner: confirm every on-premises ScreenConnect server with RMM+ installed has the RMM+ extension disabled, because no fixed RMM+ version has been announced.
    What to confirm
    • List every ScreenConnect server and whether the third-party DataComm RMM+ extension is installed.
      • All RMM+ extension versions are affected.
      • Servers without the extension are not affected.
      • The ScreenConnect server and client software are not affected.
    • For each server with RMM+, record:
      • Whether the extension is enabled or disabled.
      • Who confirmed it.
      • The date.
    • No fixed RMM+ version has been announced. Disabling the extension is the current mitigation.
      • Cloud-hosted ScreenConnect: no action required. ConnectWise disabled and removed the extension there.
      • On-premises ScreenConnect:
        • Disable the extension immediately.
        • Verify it remains disabled.
        • Do not re-enable or reinstall it pending further guidance.
      • An administrator can change the API secret, but the published remedy is to disable the extension.
  2. Network owner: confirm who could reach ScreenConnect servers that ran RMM+ with its default API secret.
    When the risk applies
    • The risk applies only while all of these were true:
      • RMM+ was installed and enabled.
      • Its API secret still had the default value.
      • Someone could send requests to the extension's API over a network.
    • The CVSS rating assumes no sign-in and no user action are needed.
    • Public exposure is unknown. The sources do not say whether affected servers face the internet.
    • A reachable ScreenConnect sign-in page does not show whether the RMM+ API is reachable or safe. The Network owner checks the network routes to each server that ran RMM+.
    • Records to use:
      • Extension inventory and the dates RMM+ was enabled.
      • Change history showing whether and when the secret was changed. Do not copy the secret value.
      • Firewall and remote-access rules for each server.
  3. Security owner: check managed-agent records for commands your team did not send.
    What the records can show
    • Review the period when RMM+ was enabled with the default secret:
      • ScreenConnect and RMM+ records of extension API requests.
      • Commands sent to managed agents.
      • Unexpected changes on managed computers.
    • Compare each command with authorized work. If any command is unexplained, start incident response.
    • Limits:
      • The sources name no specific signs of misuse.
      • The sources do not say which logs record extension API requests.
      • Disabling the extension does not rule out earlier misuse.
      • Unexplained commands need a response even if this flaw cannot be shown as the cause.

If RMM+ is enabled on an on-premises server: disable it now. Cloud-hosted ScreenConnect needs no action.

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